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Resumo
O Impacto do Alargamento da UE em 2007 no 
Compromisso Democrático da Turquia
A União Europeia constitui uma potência regional 
que promove, junto de terceiros, princípios, como 
os Direitos Humanos e a democracia, pelos quais 
se orienta. Nesse sentido, frequentemente utiliza 
uma política de “carrot and stick”, ajudando os pa‑
íses com os quais se relaciona, mas exigindo, em 
troca, mudanças reais. A Turquia, candidata à ade‑
são, é uma das visadas desta política, assim como 
um caso muito especial de integração na União. O 
caminho nessa direcção leva já algumas décadas 
e a Turquia tem assistido a vários países que ul‑
trapassam a barreira da candidatura e alcançam o 
objectivo da integração plena.
O presente trabalho visa descobrir o que é que a 
adesão da Bulgária e da Roménia significaram 
para a Turquia em termos do seu envolvimento no 
processo de democratização e até que ponto é que 
contribuiu para um maior ou menor empenho no 
processo de integração e, por consequência, no seu 
próprio processo de democratização.
Abstract
The European Union is a regional power concerned with 
some principles it stands for, such as the human rights 
or democracy. In order to pursue these principles, the 
EU uses a “carrot and stick” policy, helping the coun-
tries, but demanding real changes. Turkey, as a candida-
te for the full membership status, is object of this policy, 
as well as a very special case of accession to the EU, with 
which the Union has to deal. The path towards the ac-
cession has been going for decades and Turkey has seen 
many other countries overcoming the European barrier 
and achieving the goal of full membership.
This work aims to find out what does the Bulgarian and 
Romanian full membership meant to Turkey in terms of 
its commitment and to what extent did the last enlarge-
ment contributed to a deeper engagement of Turkey with 
its own process of integration and subsequently with its 
democratic transition process.
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Introduction
Turkey’s path towards the European Union (EU) has been long and turbu‑
lent: during the last decades, we have witnessed the advances and retreats in 
this process. In 2002, the Copenhagen European Council closed the negotiations 
with the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC’s), with Cyprus and 
Malta, as well as they gave Bulgaria and Romania some hope regarding the 
accession, postponing once again the one of Turkey. Nevertheless, the Council 
committed itself to opening the negotiations with Ankara, as long as the 2004 
Progress Report was favourable and Turkey fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria. 
This actually came to happen, but the realisation of the 2007 enlargement raised 
a wave of discontent on the Turkish side.
Having this context in mind, we will seek to understand to what extent did 
the last enlargement in 2007 influence the engagement of Turkey with its own 
process of integration and subsequently with its democratic transition process. 
In order to find out an answer for this question, and only after thinking about 
concepts involved like democracy and democratization, will we develop a com‑
parative study of the Turkish democratic performance in two periods – 2004 to 
2006 and 2007 to 2009.
Democracy and Democratisation
Brief Conceptual Analysis
Despite being a widely studied area among social scientists, the issue of democ‑
racy continues to generate countless approaches, resulting very often in a wide 
range of definitions and divisions among the academic community. First of all, it is 
important to notice that democracy can be defined by what it is not: an autocracy 
(Jaggers and Gurr, 1995: 496). We would be then following a logic that traces a po‑
litical continuum in which one of the extremes is democracy and the other an auto‑
cratic regime. Throughout that line, different political systems would be displaced, 
defined by their democratisation degree. Thus, any non‑democratic regime could 
be understood as a form of governance that, denying their citizens the possibility 
of political participation, has as priority the state’s interests, exercising the power 
arbitrarily (Giddens, 2000: 428; Pasquino, 2010: 320).
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If a non‑democratic regime is established, same changes will have to occur 
in order to modify that situation and the country to enter in a transition period 
that might eventually lead it to democracy. However, this change is not easy and 
has to overcome the obstacles of the resistance of the previous regimes, whether 
it is the economic success, the repressive logic or the power of the leaders, for 
example (Diamond, 2003: 20). Sooner or later, nevertheless, some internal and 
external dynamics begin to come up and to promote a favourable context to 
transition.
The list of factors responsible for the promotion of democratic transitions is 
very long: it includes both the agents (civil society or elites) and the structure in 
itself (social and psychological pre‑requisites, national unity, education, econo‑
my, History, international pressure,...). Being included in and/or influenced by 
international organisations, such as the Council of Europe and OSCE, or even 
other states, the democratising countries are pushed in the direction of improv‑
ing their democracy, proving that, as we stated earlier, it is a question of a mixed 
influence of internal and external factors. In Turkey, the pressure from the EU 
and the role of political and economic elites have been determinant to the suc‑
cess of the transition – or at least to the achieved results.
The aim of the transition process is to reach democracy. But what is after all 
democracy? Can we talk about democracy in Turkey or is it too early? What we 
now propose is to congregate the contribution of different authors, more closely 
following the one of Bühlmann and his team, given its completeness.
First of all, it’s important to define a central division in the field of democ‑
racy. Thus, we consider two types of this regime: the liberal and the electoral1. 
The first is known by the respect and affirmation of the civil and political rights, 
of pluralism, the rule of law, etc.; while the latter is limited to the existence 
of elections, without the actual application of the liberal democratic principles 
(Pasquino, 2010; Epstein, et al., 2007; Diamond, 2003; Schedler, 1998). Elections 
are therefore the minimum threshold under which there is no democracy.2
1 This is one possible choice among many others presented by other authors.
2 Besides the types of democracy, we could also have added the degrees of democracy, related to 
its quality and that would refine our analysis, which we have not done due to the scope of this 
article.
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Figure 1 – Democratic principles, partial regimes, functions and components
Abridged by the author from Bühlmann, et al. (2007: 47‑51)
Going back to the Bühlmann, Merkel and Wessels’ conceptualisation, Figure 
1 constitutes a simpler version of the original and it is this one that we will now 
follow. As it can be seen, they suggest three fundamental and more abstract dem‑
ocratic principles, inside of which a set of partial regimes are distributed. These 
are responsible for the normative and operational functioning of the complex 
institutional structures of the modern democracies. Not intending to go very 
deep into this question, some central aspects of each partial regime worth being 
explored.
The political rights are included in the chapter of equality and unfold in three 
different functions: participation – that embraces the rights to compete for electoral 
support (Bühlmann, et al, 2007: 17; Epstein, et al, 2006: 555) –, transparency, and 
responsiveness – “the capacity to satisfy the governed by executing its policies 
in a way that corresponds to their demands” (Morlino, 2002: 12). In other words, 
these rights involve the awareness of the real demands of the population and the 
subsequent assessment of the government’s response by the governed, in order to 
realise the convergence or divergence of its policies.
The civil rights belong to the freedom chapter and have two functions: the indi‑
vidual freedom and the rule of law. The first is a set of rights closely related to what 
we know as the Human Rights; the second comprises the principle through which 
“the state is bound to the effective law and acts according to clearly defined pre‑
rogatives.” (Bühlmann, et al., 2007: 18). In that sense, the separation of powers, the 
equality before the law and in the accession to Courts, the erga omnes application of 
the legal system, fair trials and the protection against corruption are some essential 
	  
Principles Partial Regimes Functions Components 
Equality Political Rights 
Participation Equal rights to participate 
Responsiveness Freedom to associate Freedom of opinion 
Transparency Open public sphere 
Freedom Civil Rights 
Liberty Individual rights 
Rule of Law Equality before the law Equal access to the courts 
Control 
Electoral Regime 
Vertical Accountability Free and fair elections/votes 
Representation Universal active suffrage Universal passive suffrage 
Horizontal 
Accountability 
Constraint of executive 
autonomy 
Checks and balances 
Independence of the judiciary 
Rule of law constraint 
Effective power to 
govern Governmental autonomy  
National territorial dimension 
National functional dimension 
Global dimension 
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features of this juridical institution. As we will notice, these areas are problematic 
in Turkey and constitute a serious obstacle to the consolidation of its democracy.3
The final principle, the control, is materialised in other three partial regimes, all 
of them sharing the main feature of the control and assessment of the rulers’ ac‑
tion, only varying in the way that evaluation is developed. The electoral regime is 
fundamental as it constitutes the popular sovereignty’s clearest expression (Bühl‑
mann, et al., 2007: 16); together with the political rights, both constitute the vertical 
accountability, which is the one that can be demanded by the governed and that is 
periodical (Morlino, 2002: 9, 10). The horizontal accountability refers to the rulers’ 
responsibility before other institutions or collective actors with controlling pow‑
ers over the government – the Parliament, political parties, courts, central banks, 
trade unions, etc. are the responsible for this kind of continuous oversight (Idem: 
10), implying therefore independent institutions to the effective functioning of this 
system. The last partial regime is related to the real capacity to rule, also essential 
once there is the risk that extra‑constitutional actors, not subject to the horizontal 
accountability, influence the decision‑making process, such as the military, mili‑
tias, powerful economic actors and lobbies.
Figure 2 – The study of democratic consolidation
Source: Schedler (1998)
3 L. Morlino includes in this regime the civilian democratic control over the military, which is also 
a problem in Turkey. 
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After having thought about transition and democracy, it is time to devote a 
few words about the final phase of this process: consolidation. Following the im‑
plementation of a democratic regime, this new situation is complex, lengthy and 
uncertain (Gomes, 2008: 73), as it involves “the complete institutionalization of 
a new system, the adoption of its rules and procedures, and the spread of demo‑
cratic values” (Pridham and Agh, 2001; Gomes, 2008: 73). The amount of time de‑
pends on the scope and deepness of the process that implies the gradual removal 
of the uncertainty that surrounds transition, the internalisation of its rules and 
proceedings, and the spread of the democratic values (Pridham and Vanhanen, 
2003: 02). If we take this as a pattern, it will be easily realisable the complexity 
of this stage, where the possibility of a backward movement to an authoritarian 
regime should already be very low.
We will use the model proposed by Andreas Schedler (1998: 92), according to 
whom there are a couple of possible movements within the consolidation period. 
And as Schedler uses the same typification we adopted in terms of the types of de‑
mocracy, it means that as long as elections take place, that society should be object 
of the academics’ attention in this particular field of consolidation for being in a 
stage (although in different levels) of the maturation of its own system. As it can be 
observed in Figure 2, there are three types of possible movements according to this 
proposal: positive, negative or neutral, and all of them belong to this phase. The 
idea is that, once established, a democratic society can’t relax, as there still is the 
chance of a democratic breakdown or a more subtle (and many times unnoticed) 
kind of democratic erosion (Idem: 96, 97). But it is also possible for the society to 
complete the system with a growing number of democratic characteristics, or to 
deepen its qualities in order to achieve an “advanced” democracy. Or it can simply 
reorganise itself focusing on some specific aspects (Idem: 96‑100). 
 
Methodological Approach
Our main objective, as stated earlier, is to find out the impact of the 2007 en‑
largement on the Turkish commitment to the democratisation process. In order to 
do so, we defined two chronological periods that allowed us to establish a com‑
parison: from 2004 to 2006, and from 2007 to 2009, split by the moment of Romania 
and Bulgaria’s integration.
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Figure 3 – Dimensions, indicators and data: the Turkish democracy between 2004‑2009
Source: author
The idea was to compare the Turkish effort in the first and the second periods, 
so that we could realise whether or not the enlargement influenced that effort in 
terms of the democratising process. First of all, we tried to figure out a way of 
measuring and assessing this commitment: as we showed in the previous section, 
we combined two proposals, crossing Morlino’s (2002) five dimensions with Bühl‑
mann, Merkel and Wessels’ (2007) indicators. Those five dimensions – rule of law, 
accountability, responsiveness, freedom and equality – provided us the main areas 
of democracy that afterwards became tangible with some of the indicators sug‑
gested in the work of Bühlmann and his team.
Secondly, and having established what a democracy is, we moved to the meas‑
urement: our choice implied gathering a number of different sources that provided 
quantitative data related to the period and the country in question. As the scales used 
by those institutions differ, all the values were converted into a 0‑100 scale, an index, 
in order to allow direct comparisons. From this crossing, came up Figure 3 (above), 
where the dimensions, the indicators, the sources and a variation rate are available. 
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Notwithstanding the importance of the quantitative data to bring objectivity to our 
evaluation, the Annual Progress Reports developed by the European Commission 
couldn’t be left aside and were used to counterbalance the quantifiable results.
Therefore, and after giving a quick glance at the role of the EU as a democracy 
promoter and the Turkish, Bulgarian and Romanian path towards the Union, we 
will analyse these results and try to reach some conclusion on whether Turkey was 
affected by the 2007 enlargement or not.
The European Union as a Democracy Promoter
The EU, as an international actor, has a peculiar character: it is neither a com‑
mon Westphalian sovereign state nor a merely intergovernmental organisation. Jan 
Zielonka, in his book Europe as Empire (2006), solves this dilemma by arguing that 
the enlarged Union constitutes a “neo‑medieval empire”. It means that this institu‑
tion presents characteristics which are typical of the medieval system but with post‑
modern adaptations. The idea of Empire comes from the fact that the EU exports its 
rules and relates itself very intensively with the rest of the world; simultaneously, 
the Union can’t be seen like a centralised state, as its authority is shared and diffuse 
(Zielonka, 2006: 10‑13). Sjursen (2007: 1) agrees with this special statute of the EU 
and argues that the study of the European Foreign Policy needs to be reassessed, as 
the Union is not a common international actor, what requires a different perspective 
of analysis.
Apart from this interesting conception, we should understand the EU as the 
international organisation it is. And as such, it has a special role in the interna‑
tional arena: “International institutions define who the players are in a particular 
situation and how they define their roles, and thus place constraints on behav‑
iour.” (Simmons and Martin, 2005: 198). They function therefore as a framing 
for the international actors, having the capability to change their identities and 
interests as a result of the interaction on time limited by a set of rules and norms. 
In other words, there is a promotion of the adequate behavioural patterns that re‑
minds us of the socialisation process, making international organisations part of 
the states, at the same time states can also influence the organisations they are in.
So, from the perspective of the agency, the EU tries to promote a certain im‑
age that is supposed to reflect its identity – keeping that as a guideline for its ac‑
tion and its relations to third states, the European Union is assuring coherence4, 
4 The doubts about the existence of a single European identity will not be developed here, as it 
extrapolates the logic of the paper.
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whether the enlargement policy, the commercial policy or any other is at stake. 
The Portuguese researcher Andreia Soares (2009: 98) refers to the “common Eu‑
ropean values” namely associated with peace and prosperity (the initial main 
objectives of the Communities), and democratic values, such as the respect for 
the Human Rights and the fundamental freedoms. As the EU Treaty puts it and 
the member‑states subscribe: “The Union is founded on the values of respect 
for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights (...)” (EUT, article 2). This implies that, despite the unavoidable 
diversity regarding the constitution of the European Union with its 27 members, 
there is some degree of coherence in its action given by these principles all the 
member‑states accepted. 
One of those principles is precisely democracy, whose importance has been 
growing in legal and practical terms during the last decades. As a result, the world‑
wide promotion of democracy arises as one of the most important objectives of the 
External European Policy:
“The Union’s action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles 
which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it 
seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and 
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, 
the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United 
Nations Charter and international law.” (EUT, article 21)
Through a wide range of policies (neighbourhood, enlargement, commercial 
agreements,...), the EU functions as a strong centre of attraction – democratically 
speaking too. Michael Emerson and Gergana Noutcheva (2004: 2) use an illustra‑
tive metaphor imported from Physics: the gravity model of democratisation relies 
on the idea that, like the centre of gravity that attracts the objects towards itself, so 
do the big reference democracies promote the convergence of other countries. And 
although there are some sceptical voices regarding this EU’s capacity of effectively 
promoting democracy in other countries5, security, well‑being, peace, modernisa‑
tion and others are good motives for this attraction, apart from the more material 
benefits that will arise if a country decides to accept this democratic promotion in 
its state. In the case of the EU, this is developed through a normative, soft power 
model (Manners and Whitman, 2003: 389; Tafel, 2008: 8; Manners, 2002; Tafel, 2008: 
2), where mechanisms like socialisation and conditionality are preferred to others. 
One has to admit that not always can the EU be regarded as a successful actor 
namely in what comes to the promotion of democracy, but the success of condi‑
5 See, for example, Raik (2004, 2006)
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tionality, for instance, cannot be disregarded, mainly when it is used in the context 
of the enlargement policy. And even though this academics’ position creates the 
idea of them being “naïve moralists” (Sjursen, 2007: 4) for considering the EU a 
“normative, civilising or ethical power within the international system” (Ibidem), 
the fact is that the issue of democracy, as well as Human Rights and others, are 
some of conditionality’s demands and the countries with relations with the Euro‑
pean Union spend some effort on the accomplishments of the wanted results.
The enlargement process is considered one of the most successful leverage 
mechanisms within the European external relations6 regarding democracy promo‑
tion. Turkey, as a candidate, is part of this process and, subsequently, has to cope 
with the conditionality imposed by the aquis communautaire and the Copenhagen 
criteria. And despite the eventual success of these policies, the transposition into 
the domestic law is sometimes quite difficult and creates a certain degree of ten‑
sion between Turkey and the European Union, as it happens concerning the civil‑
military relations and the respect for the human rights, more specifically for mi‑
norities, for example. Nevertheless, these are some areas that need to be worked on 
and the EU, with an attractive enlargement process and an effective conditionality 
policy, can be regarded as a “considerable transformative power in the applicant 
countries” (Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 2008: 188), namely in the area of democ‑
racy. As the same authors explain:
“And although this literature would not claim that the EU accession conditionality 
is more important than domestic conditions of democratisation, it demonstrates that 
in many cases the Union’s external incentives have been instrumental in overcoming 
domestic obstacles to further democratic reform.” (Ibidem)
So, in a nutshell, we might consider the European Union a democracy promot‑
er through a set of differentiated policies and mechanisms. Together with domes‑
tic factors, the presence of this international organisation in countries like Turkey, 
namely through certain policies such as the already mentioned conditionality, has 
contributed to the acceleration of the pace of democratisation. 
The Path towards the EU: Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania
Turkey‑European Union relations have been object of the attention of many 
scholars under different perspectives. Here, they will only be used to frame our 
6 See, for example, Emerson et al. (2005: 5); Goksel and Cepel (2006:7); Schimmelfennig and Scholtz 
(2008: 188); Tafel (2008: 2).
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main objective, as the nature of this relationship is crucial to understand the Turk‑
ish position and the movements of its commitment towards the European Union 
and democratisation processes.
Although the relationship with Europe could be traced back to the Otto‑
man Empire period, due to the influence received from the West and to the 
Ottoman involvement in the European concert, this agitated process started in 
1959 when Turkey asked for Association with the EEC. It came to happen four 
years later, since when the ups and downs have always been present in this link 
with the West. A critical point was reached in the 70ies with the Turkish inva‑
sion of Cyprus (Faucompret and Konings, 2008: 24‑29). In spite of this situation 
the proposals for integration were as recurrent as the European Community’s 
refusals. The organisation justified its position with the political and economic 
instability of the country. Still, in 1996 an agreement on customs union entered 
into force and in 1999, in the Helsinki Summit, Turkey was given the candidate 
status, for being considered that the country already fulfilled the majority of 
the Copenhagen criteria. As a matter of fact, other two factors are suspected to 
be involved in this positive movement: firstly, because of the CEEC’s accept‑
ance in NATO, being Turkey one of its members; secondly, the Greek allowed 
that status to Turkey, once granted that Cyprus would join the Community 
(Idem, 28; Fernandes, 2005: 131).
In March 2001 an Accession Partnership is signed and in the next year the 
Turkish government creates the “National Programme for the Adoption of the 
Acquis”, followed by a considerable reforming effort: 34 constitutional amend‑
ments in 2001, and a new Civil Code considerable changes in sensitive areas, like 
the Human Rights and some freedoms – “These reforms were the first crucial 
responses to EU conditionality.” (Düzgit and Keyman, 2007: 73). As an incentive, 
the EU raises the financial pre‑accession assistance during the following years, 
also thanks to the impetus provided by the AKP, the opposition and the civil 
society, all of them committed to this project, despite the internal obstacles some 
tried to lift (Idem: 76‑79). Yet, the Turkish efforts were rewarded by the positive 
judgment of the 2004 Progress Report that allowed the European Council of that 
same year to give green light to the opening of the accession negotiations (Fau‑
compret and Konings, 2008: 45).
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Graph 1 – Bulgaria and Turkey’s performances compared
Graph 2 – Romania and Turkey’s performances compared
Grey ‑ Bulgaria; Black ‑ Turkey
Source: Transformation Atlas 2010, Bartelsmann Stiftung
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Düzgit and Keyman (2007: 74) assess this long process: “As can be seen from 
the brief description of events given above, the role of the EU triggering the steps 
towards a more consolidated democratic system is undeniable.”.In fact, that was 
how it worked in the considered period. Nonetheless, after being overcome by 
Greece, the Iberian countries and by all the other enlargement processes that in 
the meanwhile took place, what could have been the impact of the last one? As it 
is known, Romania and Bulgaria are geographically closed to Turkey and, for the 
Turks, their performances were not sufficiently better to justify the integration. 
Graphs 1 and 2, built with the tool available at the Bartelsmann Stiftung website, 
show a comparison between the three countries. 
In relation to Bulgaria, for example, most indicators have been better performed 
in this already EU‑member: the socioeconomic level, the stability of the democratic 
institutions, the rule of law, political participation and stateness are the ones where 
the hiatus is more visible (and the ones more important in terms of democracy). 
Still, the difference is almost always about one point out of ten. However, in all 
the other indicators both countries are quite even: notice that except the political 
and social integration, the others relate directly to the economic performances – so 
many times highlighted as an obstacle to the Turkish integration.
Regarding Romania, we find a similar situation, but the difference between 
the two neighbours is not as remarkable as in the previous case. Overall in the 
economic domain, Turkey performs as good as or better than Romania. In socio‑
political terms, except for the socioeconomic level, Turkey is very closed or even 
sometimes at the same stage (political and social integration, stability of demo‑
cratic institutions and the rule of law are good examples).
A more detailed study was developed by Nicholas Sarokhanian and Yannis 
Stivachtis and it was exclusively based on a comparative approach regarding the 
European Commission Annual Progress Reports of Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania:
“In an effort to emphasize that Turkey has, so far, been unjustly left outside the Eu‑
ropean Union, many have argued that when compared to Bulgaria and Romania, 
Turkey scores better in its fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria than the 
other two, which jointed the EU on 1 January 2007.” (Sarokhanian and Stivachtis, 
2008: 279)
The authors compare the different chapters of the Reports individually and rec‑
ognise, for example, that in relation to both countries, Turkey needs some improve‑
ment in the fighting against corruption and transparency (Idem: 283) – two impor‑
tant features of the rule of law. However, it is noticed that the executive branch of 
the Turkish public administration is better than the one of Romania (Idem: 284). 
The critics regarding the implementation of the acquis in terms of the judicial sys‑
tem were similar to Romania’s and that, in this field, “At the time of accession of 
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Bulgaria and Romania, Turkey was at least at the same level of meeting the criteria 
or even further along” (Idem: 286). In what comes to anti‑corruption measures, the 
authors understood from the reports that, although there are some concerns with 
this area in Turkey, it is not comparable to the “major structural threat” that cor‑
ruption represents in Bulgaria and Romania (Idem: 287).
Many other fields are scrutinised by the authors: on the one hand, for instance, 
human rights are the Achilles’ heel for Turkey (Idem: 288); on the other hand, in 
terms of civil and political rights, “Turkey shows greater advancements in most 
areas when compared to Romania and it is also farther advanced than Bulgaria in 
some realms” (Idem: 292), as it also happens in the domain of economic, social and 
cultural rights.
After having analysed the various chapters, the researchers recognised that, 
despite the need for some further changes in the Turkish society, this country fulfils 
the political Copenhagen criteria, concluding that “The progress shown is compa‑
rable to the relative statutes of Bulgaria and Romania when they acceded.” (Idem: 
299). Truth is that the differences between both countries were not that remarkable 
and it will be our aim in the next section to find out if that caused a lack of motiva‑
tion in the Turkish democratic commitment.
The Evolution of Turkey’s Democratic Commitment 
 
In terms of a general oversight in relation to the Turkish democracy, in Graph 
3 all the indexes put the status of the system in this country above the line of 
the 50 points. The existence of a democracy seems therefore accepted by the three 
consulted sources. Given our central democratic division, in fact, Turkey does not 
seem to be just an electoral democracy; notice that for the “Transformation Index” 
from the Bartelsmann Stiftung, it comes close to 80. Are we thus talking about a 
Graph 3 – General democracy index (Turkey, 2004‑2009)
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transition or a democratic consolidation? According to what we have been argu‑
ing, the transition includes the antecedents and the moment of the regime change 
in itself – since 1923, Turkey has a liberal Constitution: for many it is a sign that it 
has already moved in the direction of the consolidation. But if we raise our stand‑
ards up, only with the democratic improvements brought by the last decades, it 
seems to be wise to consider a democratic consolidation. Some reasons point in 
that direction: a) the EU’s measures and conditionality policies are demanding 
from the point of view of democracy and in 2004 the negotiations were opened; b) 
although we refer to consolidation, it does not imply a constant improvement in 
the quality of the political system; c) according to Raik (2005: 569), the studies on 
the international dimensions of the transitions fail when focusing on the phases of 
the regime change, as the EU integration can only start after transition is complete, 
that is, when it starts to consolidate.
Examining the data provided by Graph 4, we realise that the different institu‑
tions reveal contradictory values: for the Bartelsmann Stiftung, the evolution was 
positive given the rise of 6.7% of the Turkish democratic performance; however 
for the Freedom House, the progress was null, and for The Economist there was a 
retrocession of ‑0.18%. Once we have this contradiction in our hands, an individual 
analysis of the already defined dimensions seems to be more accurate to assess this 
democracy. 
Corruption is the first indicator and the only one that showed an interrupted 
growth since 2004 (Graph 5). Both for Transparency International and for the Freedom 
House the movement was positive, but always with values in the negative field or 
very close to the threshold. Nevertheless, in the Progress Reports the conclusions 
were different: in the first three years, the signature and ratification of conventions, 
and the adoption of specific and concrete measures aren’t obscured by the existing 
gaps; in all those years, the reports refer “some progress” (European Commission, 
2004: 28; 2005: 17; 2006: 59).  This pattern is not found from 2007 to 2009 though: 
Graph 4 – General democracy index variation rates between two periods (Turkey, 2004‑2009)
Nação e Defesa157
The Impact of European Union 2007 
Enlargement on Turkey’s Democratic Commitment
“limited progress” (Idem, 2007: 59; 2008: 67; 2009: 12) is the expression used in 
the documents, conveying the idea of a contrary tendency to the one given by the 
quantitative data. In that sense, we can argue that this is an unstable domain of 
the Turkish democracy. Despite the positive evolution showed by the graph, the 
values do not even reach the middle of the scale; on the other side, the EU presents 
a negative tendency, pointing the fingers to the failures of the fight against cor‑
ruption – in 2007 Turkey did not implement the measures of the Group of States 
Against Corruption and was criticised by the practice of bribes.
Regarding the military intervention, the same graph illustrates an opposite 
tendency: since 2005, the country’s performance in this area has suffered an ac‑
centuated and continuous decrease, according to the data from the Economic Free-
dom of the World. This same opinion is shared by the European Commission – the 
institution praises the effort and the results of the measures on the civilian control 
over the military and on the decrease of their influence on politics. The reports 
mention progresses, namely vis‑à‑vis the National Security Council, whose action 
was constrained and where the number of civilians was augmented. (Idem, 2004: 
21‑23; 2005: 14). However, in 2006 there is not as much optimism as in previous 
years (“limited progress”), and in 2007 and 2008 there is a clear inversion of the 
assessment: “overall no progress” (Idem, 2007: 9; 2008: 9). In 2009 there are signs 
of slight improvement.
The last issue raised by the rule of law is the judiciary, for which the graph 
describes an enhancement until 2006 and a decrease of the quality after that year. 
The Progress Reports, from 2004 to 2006, highlight the positive adopted measures 
in this domain, especially regarding the new Penal Code, the establishment of 
the Justice Academy, and the application of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. In 2006, the Commission wrote: “Overall, there was continued progress in 
the area of judicial reform” (Idem, 2006: 10). But in the next year, although they rec‑
ognise the improvements at the judicial efficiency, the document reports a special 
concern on the system’s independence (Idem, 2007: 10) and impartiality that are 
Graph 5 – The rule of law in Turkey (2004‑2007)
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reiterated in 2008 (Idem, 2008: 10) and in 2009 (Idem, 2009: 9). As a result, in what 
comes to the rule of law, its weaknesses and lack of solidity were revealed; almost 
all indicators noted a deterioration of the quality of this dimension’s elements, 
especially since 2006. Overall, and as is shown by Graph 6, built with the average 
of all the indicators, the evolution from the first to the second period was pretty 
negative, almost reaching a decrease of about 14%.
Again in contradiction, as the Graph 7 shows, the data related to the account‑
ability indicators diverge: a slight improvement according to the Freedom House, 
and a significant break in the governmental performance for The Economist. Yet, 
both are above the 50 threshold, in a green zone. 
In the Progress Reports, the section regarding the government was specially 
taken into consideration: in every  single year, the European Union considered 
that the executive was both democratically elected and very deeply engaged in the 
integration process, accomplishing the necessary reforms in accordance with that. 
They also reported the cooperation with the main opposition party, both keeping 
their electoral promises. Furthermore, the documents highlighted the large voter 
turnout and the renewed trust in the AKP in the second elections, what meant the 
satisfaction with the governmental performance (Idem, 2004: 20; 2005: 11; 2006: 
6; 2007: 7; 2008: 7; 2009: 8). Thereupon, this seems to be a relatively successful 
domain, but also pretty difficult to evaluate. Still, the evolution between the two 
periods ended up being negative, due to The Economist’s data (Graph 6).
In order to assess the responsiveness, the third dimension of the table, we ana‑
lysed the popular trust in two national institutions (Graph 8): the Parliament and 
the Government, as we found relevant to estimate the way their performance is 
or is not in accordance with the demands and wishes of the electorate. Both lines 
developed a parallel and very close route, but also both with an elevated degree 
of instability – in each year the tendency inverted. The strength of the 2008 fall, 
however, gave a negative connotation to the evolution between the two periods. 
Graph 6 – Variation rate per dimension
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This situation does not become clearer with the reading of the Progress Reports, 
once they are not critical about these organs and they only practically refer to their 
democratic character, not allowing further conclusions. 
On the contrary, the next domain is far more complex: freedom is expressed 
through a wide range of possible indicators, namely the ones represented in Graph 
9, and the interpretation of those values should be very careful, as diverse issues 
are at stake. The freedom of the press is the first one to be studied and according 
to the used sources, although they diverge in the degree of freedom, the progress 
between the two periods is negative. For the European Commission, the perform-
ance in terms of this kind of freedom was pretty unstable: on the one hand, Turkey 
was able to reach some improvements, but, on the other hand, there still are recur-
rent constraints on the non-violent expression of opinion. The Commission states 
some improvements in many years, but always shows its concern regarding this 
sector, such as the excessively high fines, excessive prosecutions and convictions, 
etc. (Idem, 2004: 38; 2005: 25; 2006: 14; 2007: 14; 2008: 16; 2009: 18). 
The second element is related to the political rights – persecutions, torture and 
ill-treatment are some indicators investigated by the International Amnesty, whose 
Graph 8 – Responsiveness in Turkey (2004-2009)
Graph 7 – Accountability in Turkey (2005-2007)
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reports negatively assess the Turkish fulfilment, especially in 2006 and 2007, where 
a more accentuated decline was felt. The European Commission shares a different 
opinion though: for the Union, Turkey always spent a great effort on the resolution 
of these problems, having adopted since 2004 a 0‑tolerance policy with practical ef‑
fects achieved; however, in 2008 and 2009, the number of reported cases increased, 
as well as the concerns about the impunity of the authors of these crimes. Hence, 
the governmental “limited efforts” are considered the main responsible for this 
situation in the last years (Idem, 2008: 14; 2009: 16).
In what comes to civil liberties, the Freedom House has also registered a neg‑
ative trend. However, as we can understand from the graphs, it was a slight 
negative trend and this dimension always kept the positive results. In the Euro‑
pean Commission Reports, the results regarding the religious and of assembly 
freedoms were similar: the first has shown some progress, although limited by 
the persistence of the problem felt by non‑Muslim groups (except in 2009); the 
second was also marked by improvements throughout the years, especially in 
terms of the legal framing. There still are nevertheless obstacles in practice to 
be overcome.  On the whole, as shown by Graph 6, the freedom field evolved 
positively. Apart from the noticed failures in the different domains, the efforts on 
the reforms promoted some not very accentuated but real positive effects. Even 
though, for the effective consolidation of the new reality, more than only these 
formal changes are necessary: the familiarisation of the population with the new 
principles, their internalisation and application in everyday life are crucial steps 
to be taken.
The last dimension, equality, wasn’t able to be easily detected in the Progress 
Reports given their specificity. Yet, some general considerations can be made, hav‑
ing in mind Graph 10: a) in the three indicators used, there was no variation; b) 
only the electoral process and pluralism registered a solid punctuation, almost in 
Graph 9 – Freedom in Turkey (2004‑2009)
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the order of the 80 points; c) the other two were below the minimum threshold. For 
these reasons, we consider this area to be very difficult to assess and to draw some 
conclusions from.
Graph 11 shows us a comparative approach with the evolution of each one of 
the dimensions between the two periods. And as we verified, although equality and 
freedom kept similar or have slightly improved, the other three dimensions suffered 
a retrocession in the second period. This development can even be more clearly ap‑
preciated in the already known Graph 6, where it is also represented and which 
confirms the above mentioned conclusions. Graph 12 makes available the annual 
progress of each field. We emphasise: a) the volatility of the different dimensions in 
time; b ) the lack of a clear pattern of growth or retrocession; c) overall and in general, 
we are able to notice a decrease since 2006 in almost all dimensions (responsive is 
Graph 10 – Equality in Turkey (2006, 2008)
Graph 11 – The evolution of Turkey democracy in the two periods
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the exception, as it only starts to decrease in the next year), a convergence in 2008 
with smaller values and distinctive behaviours in 2009. Once again, we reiterate that 
there is no clear and pure pattern, but we can draw some conclusions from the gen‑
eral tendency of decrease in the second period. Thus, and using the available data, 
some reflections and deductions might be risked: what kind of democracy is present 
in Turkey? Is this country going through a process of completing or deepening its 
democracy? And how can we assess the development of Turkey’s effort during the 
periods? What was after all the effect of the 2007 enlargement?
Conclusion
Attending to the performance of the Turkish society in the different fields and 
the recent reforms and improvements, we tend to believe that it is not a merely 
electoral democracy anymore, finding itself in the way to the consolidation of the 
liberal nature of its regime. There is, we can state, a certain hybridism that allows 
us to locate it in the movement of completing its regime. In other words, the Turk‑
ish democracy has already abandoned the electoral type and is getting closer to 
the liberal one.
We believe that it is wise to argue that there is, in fact, a negative progress of 
the Turkish effort on its own process of democratic consolidation, naturally very 
tightly linked to the accession to the EU, reflected by the results of those changes 
Graph 12 – Annual evolution per dimension
Rule of  Law
Freedom
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that were less visible during the period from 2007 to 2009. Thus, we consider that 
the preferences and interests of the country, as result of the constant interactions, 
changed: until 2006/2007, there was a shift from a prior phase of carelessness to a 
proactive effort; then, after 2007, again to despondency. 
The reasons that underlie these changes are many, but we recognise that  Turks’ 
ideas and perceptions were significant to that negative movement. After the prom‑
ise of opening the negotiations of accession (that worked like a “carrot”) there was 
a doubled effort to make the needed reforms. Nevertheless, after having reached 
that “carrot”, and perceiving the accession of two countries geographically close 
and whose political and economic performances the Turks did not regard as much 
different as theirs, their interpretation of these facts might have originated a shift 
in their behaviour, now less committed to the closeness to Europe. Notice that, in 
the last years, that movement coincided with a reinforcement of Turkey’s regional 
influence on the Middle East – the mediation efforts in the case of Iran and the nu‑
clear question, in the opposition to the Gaza blockade and the flotilla incident are 
good examples, regarded by many as a “return to Asia”.
In fact, the data appears to show a retrocession; eventually it consists in a decel‑
eration of the reforms’ pace, and in that case we would need more data to confirm, 
mainly related to 2008 and 2009. However, it does not deny the EU influence on 
the Turkish reality; on the contrary, such is visible in many occasions and contexts. 
Still, there is a strong tendency to think that one of the possible explanations of 
the general negative evolution might be the lack of enthusiasm caused by the 2007 
enlargement: note that some authors, like Levitz and Pop‑Elaches (2010: 479‑480), 
argue that even after accession the effort on the reforms might possibly slow down, 
but does not stop or retreat. It calls into question the theory that defends that, after 
the opening of the negotiations, Turkey relaxed from its effort. Besides, the nego‑
tiations were allowed after the 2004 Report, and in 2005 and 2006 there was still 
an intense rhythm. We should also not forget the controversial discourse inside 
the European Union: the Commission is more permissive and optimistic, but the 
Council is divided and refuses consecutively the approach to Turkey, postponing 
sine die a final decision – France, Germany and Greece constitute the nucleus of 
that side.
Although the study has left some open ends, which were beyond the scope 
of the theoretical framework chosen and that need to be further deepened, we 
consider that these conclusions are willing to be considered a possible answer to 
the initial doubts, given the theoretical outline and the developed analysis and 
interpretation. Thus, we subscribe and support these results, waiting for new ap‑
proaches to this question.
Split between two continents, Turkey is very likely to be in the coming time a 
lively motive for debate inside the EU, among academics and the population in 
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general, as it raises important questions related to the European identity, limits 
and nature. However, the divergent signs the Union has sent do not contribute to 
the necessary harmony to the societal transformations that the EU demands. Thus, 
it urges more coherence in its action in relation to Turkey, in order to promote the 
alterations that the European Union stands for or to take the “stick” away if it can‑
not assure the presence of the “carrot”.
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